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We present improved results and more general results for the decoy-state measurement device
independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) where the intensities of all 3 pulses can be
non-zero. We present a more tightened explicit formula for the lower bound of the yield of two
single-photon pulses for this generalized 3-intensity protocol, which can be applied to the recently
proposed MDI-QKD with imperfect single-photon sources such as the coherent states or the heralded
states from the parametric down-conversion. We strictly prove that our result is better than the
prior art result. With this result, the final key rate rises drastically.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.81.Gs, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, much attention has been spent on the secu-
rity of real set-ups in quantum key distribution (QKD) [1,
2]. After the proposal of the decoy state method [3–
12], the security of QKD with an imperfect single photon
source is guaranteed given whatever Eve’s attack to the
channel, including the famous photon-number splitting
attack [13, 14].
However, the guaranteed security assumes that Eve
cannot attack device inside Alice or Bob’s lab. As was
demonstrated [15], given a lossy channel and limited de-
tection efficiency, Eve can attack the gated-mode detec-
tors inside Alice or Bob’s lab if there is no additional
device to detect the abnormally strong light at Alice or
Bob’s lab. To reach the goal of ultimate security, one
can, in principle use the device independent protocol [16].
However, these protocols seem to be technically demand-
ing at the moment.
Recently, measurement device independent QKD
(MDI-QKD) was proposed based on the idea of entangle-
ment swapping [17, 18]. If we want to obtain a higher key
rate, we can choose to directly use an imperfect single-
photon source such as the coherent state [18] with decoy-
state method for this, say the MDI decoy-state method.
Calculation formulas for the practical decoy-state imple-
mentation with only a few different states has been stud-
ied in, e.g., Refs. [19, 20], and then further studied both
experimentally [21–23] and theoretically [24–27]. Theo-
retical study for the decoy-state MDI-QKD with only a
few intensities are of particularly interesting. The first
formula for 3-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD was pro-
posed in [20]. It assumes that each user uses three differ-
ent states, one vacuum state and two non-vacuum states.
The results can apply to sources such as the coherent
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states, the parametric down conversion, and so on. It
was then extended to the case that the 3 intensities are
all non-vacuum coherent states [24]. One can see that the
major formula there is identical with the one in Ref.[20] in
the case when Alice and Bob use coherent pulses and the
weakest pulse is vacuum. In Ref.[27, 28], we presented an
improved explicit formulas of 3-state decoy-state method
for the MDI-QKD with the weakest pulse being vacuum.
Here in this work, we shall present an improved results
for the decoy-state MDI-QKD where all 3 intensities are
non-vacuum. Compared with the prior-art result [24],
our improved formulas here make a more tightened faith-
ful estimation of the yield and the phase flip rate of the
single-photon pulse pairs and hence can raise the final
key rate drastically. Also, our result is for a general type
of sources with a simple condition, it does not limit to the
coherent-state source. In the second section, we present
the improved explicit formulas for 3-intensity decoy-state
MDI-QKD and prove analytically that our result is bet-
ter than the previous [24]. In the third section, we give
the numerical simulations. The article is ended with a
concluding remark.
II. GENERALIZED THREE-INTENSITY
DECOY STATE METHOD FOR MDI-QKD
In the protocol, each time a pulse-pair (two-pulse
state) is sent to the relay for detection. The relay is con-
trolled by an un-trusted third party (UTP). The UTP
will announce whether the pulse-pair has caused a suc-
cessful event. Those bits corresponding to successful
events will be post-selected and further processed for the
final key. Since real set-ups only use imperfect single-
photon sources, we need the decoy-state method for se-
curity.
We assume Alice (Bob) has three sources, vA, dA, sA
(vB, dB , sB) which can only emit three different states
ρvA , ρdA , ρsA (ρvB , ρdB , ρsB ), respectively, in photon
2number space. It’s worth pointing out that our proto-
col is applicable to the weakest pulse being vacuum or
not. Suppose


ρvA =
∑
k a
v
k|k〉〈k|, ρvB =
∑
k b
v
k|k〉〈k|,
ρdA =
∑
k a
d
k|k〉〈k|, ρdB =
∑
k b
d
k|k〉〈k|,
ρsA =
∑
k a
s
k|k〉〈k|, ρsB =
∑
k b
s
k|k〉〈k|.
(1)
At each time, Alice will randomly select one of her 3
sources to emit a pulse, and so does Bob. The pulse form
Alice and the pulse from Bob form a pulse pair and are
sent to the UTP. We regard equivalently that each time
a two-pulse source is selected and a pulse pair (one pulse
from Alice, one pulse from Bob) is emitted. There are
many different two-pulse sources used in the protocol.
We denote αβ for the two pulse source when the pulse-
pair is produced by source α at Alice’s side and source
β at Bob’s side, α can be one of {vA, dA, sA} and β can
be one of {vB, dB , sB}. For example, at a certain time j
Alice uses source vA and Bob uses source sB, we say the
pulse pair is emitted by source vAsB.
In the protocol, two different bases (e.g., Z basis con-
sisting of horizontal polarization |H〉〈H | and vertical po-
larization |V 〉〈V |, and X basis consisting of pi/4 and
3pi/4 polarizations) are used. The density operator in
photon number space alone does not describe the state
in the composite space. We shall apply the decoy-state
method analysis in the same basis (e.g., Z basis or X
basis) for pulses from sources αβ(α ∈ {vA, dA, sA}, β ∈
{vB, dB, sB}). Therefore we only need consider the den-
sity operators in the photon number space.
According to the decoy-state theory, the yield of a cer-
tain set of pulse pairs is defined as the happening rate
of a successful event (announced by the UTP) corre-
sponding to pulse pairs out of the set. We use cap-
ital letter Yαβ to denote the nine yields for sources
αβ(α ∈ {vA, dA, sA}, β ∈ {vB, dB, sB}) and these val-
ues can be directly calculated from the observed exper-
imental data. We use ymn to denotes the yield given
that Alice and Bob send respectively an m-photon and
n-photon pulses.
Our first major task is to deduce y11 from the
known values, i.e., to formulate y11, the yield of state
|1〉〈1| ⊗ |1〉〈1| in the nine known values {Yαβ |α ∈
{vA, dA, sA}, β ∈ {vB, dB, sB}}. Using the convex propo-
sition, we have the following relations
Yαβ =
∑
k,l≥0
aαk b
β
l ykl, (2)
where α ∈ {vA, dA, sA} and β ∈ {vB, dB, sB}. In prac-
tice, the imperfect single-photon sources have the prop-
erty that the probability of emitting an empty pulse is
greater than the probability of the no-empty pulse. With
this fact, in order to estimate the lower bound of y11, we
need to eliminate the unknown values y0l(l ≥ 0) and
yk0(k ≥ 0) firstly.
Without causing any ambiguity, we omit the subscripts
A and B in the following of this paper. Cancel out the
terms y0k and yj0 using Gaussian elimination, we obtain
the following four relations


av0b
v
0Yˆdd − a
v
0b
d
0Yˆdv − a
d
0b
v
0Yˆvd + a
d
0b
d
0Yˆvv = 0,
av0b
v
0Yˆds − a
v
0b
s
0Yˆdv − a
d
0b
v
0Yˆvs + a
d
0b
s
0Yˆvv = 0,
av0b
v
0Yˆsd − a
v
0b
d
0Yˆsv − a
s
0b
v
0Yˆvd + a
s
0b
d
0Yˆvv = 0,
av0b
v
0Yˆss − a
v
0b
s
0Yˆsv − a
s
0b
v
0Yˆvs + a
s
0b
s
0Yˆvv = 0,
(3)
where Yˆij = Yij −
∑
k,l≥1 a
i
kb
j
l ykl, (i, j ∈ {v, d, s}). For
the sake of convenience, we denote


Y˜ ′dd = a
v
0b
v
0Ydd − a
v
0b
d
0Ydv − a
d
0b
v
0Yvd + a
d
0b
d
0Yvv,
Y˜ ′ds = a
v
0b
v
0Yds − a
v
0b
s
0Ydv − a
d
0b
v
0Yvs + a
d
0b
s
0Yvv,
Y˜ ′sd = a
v
0b
v
0Ysd − a
v
0b
d
0Ysv − a
s
0b
v
0Yvd + a
s
0b
d
0Yvv,
Y˜ ′ss = a
v
0b
v
0Yss − a
v
0b
s
0Ysv − a
s
0b
v
0Yvs + a
s
0b
s
0Yvv,
(4)
and introduce the following notations
hixk =
xik
xi0
, (k ≥ 0;x ∈ {a, b}; i ∈ {v, d, s}). (5)
Divide the four relations in Eq.(3) by the positive factors
av0a
d
0b
v
0b
d
0, a
v
0a
d
0b
v
0b
s
0, a
v
0a
s
0b
v
0b
d
0 and a
v
0a
s
0b
v
0b
s
0 respectively,
we obtain the following simplified equation


Y˜dd =
∑
k,l≥1(h
d
ak
− hvak)(h
d
bl
− hvbl)ykl,
Y˜ds =
∑
k,l≥1(h
d
ak
− hvak)(h
s
bl
− hvbl)ykl,
Y˜sd =
∑
k,l≥1(h
s
ak
− hvak)(h
d
bl
− hvbl)ykl,
Y˜ss =
∑
k,l≥1(h
s
ak
− hvak)(h
s
bl
− hvbl)ykl.
(6)
where Y˜ij are defined as follows
Y˜ij =
Y˜ ′ij
av0a
i
0b
v
0b
j
0
, (i, j ∈ {d, s}), (7)
with Y˜ ′ij being presented in Eq.(4). Furthermore, if we
introduce
h˜ixk = h
i
xk
− hvxk , (k ≥ 0;x ∈ {a, b}; i ∈ {v, d, s}), (8)
with hixk defined in Eq.(5), we can write the relations
about variables ykl given by Eq.(6) into the following
simplified form
Y˜dd = h˜
d
a1
h˜db1y11 + h˜
d
a1
h˜db2y12 + h˜
d
a2
h˜db1y21 + Jdd, (9)
Y˜ds = h˜
d
a1
h˜sb1y11 + h˜
d
a1
h˜sb2y12 + h˜
d
a2
h˜sb1y21 + Jds,(10)
Y˜sd = h˜
s
a1
h˜db1y11 + h˜
s
a1
h˜db2y12 + h˜
s
a2
h˜db1y21 + Jsd,(11)
Y˜ss = h˜
s
a1
h˜sb1y11 + h˜
s
a1
h˜sb2y12 + h˜
s
a2
h˜sb1y21 + Jss,(12)
where Y˜ij is defined in Eq.(4), h˜
i
xk
is given by Eq.(8),
and Jij =
∑
(k,l)∈J1
h˜iak h˜
j
bl
ykl, (i, j ∈ {d, s}) with J1 =
{(k, l)|k, l ≥ 1; k + l ≥ 4}.
3With these preparations, now we are going to introduce
the following very important condition:
h˜sxk
h˜dxk
≥
h˜sx2
h˜dx2
≥
h˜sx1
h˜dx1
, (x ∈ {a, b}) (13)
for k ≥ 2. We can easily prove that the imperfect sources
used in practice such as the coherent state source, the
heralded source out of the parametric-down conversion,
satisfy the above restriction.
In order to get a lower bound of y11, we should derive
the expression of y11 with Eqs.(9-12) firstly. Combining
Eqs.(9-11), we obtain the expression of y11 by eliminating
y12 and y21 such that
y11 = y
(123)
11 +
∑
(m,n)∈J1
f
(123)
11 (m,n)ymn, (14)
where J1 = {(m,n)|m ≥ 1, n ≥ 1,m+ n ≥ 4},
y
(123)
11 =
(h˜da1 h˜
s
a2
h˜db1 h˜
s
b2
− h˜sa1 h˜
d
a2
h˜sb1 h˜
d
b2
)Y˜dd − h˜
d
b1
h˜db2(h˜
d
a1
h˜sa2 − h˜
s
a1
h˜da2)Y˜ds − h˜
d
a1
h˜da2(h˜
d
b1
h˜sb2 − h˜
s
b1
h˜db2)Y˜sd
h˜da1 h˜
d
b1
(h˜da1 h˜
s
a2
− h˜sa1 h˜
d
a2
)(h˜db1 h˜
s
b2
− h˜sb1 h˜
d
b2
)
, (15)
and
f
(123)
11 (m,n) =
h˜da2 h˜
d
bn
(h˜da1 h˜
s
am
− h˜sa1 h˜
d
am
)(h˜db1 h˜
s
b2
− h˜sb1 h˜
d
b2
) + h˜dam h˜
d
b1
(h˜da1 h˜
s
a2
− h˜sa1 h˜
d
a2
)(h˜db2 h˜
s
bn
− h˜sb2 h˜
d
bn
)
h˜da1 h˜
d
b1
(h˜da1 h˜
s
a2
− h˜sa1 h˜
d
a2
)(h˜db1 h˜
s
b2
− h˜sb1 h˜
d
b2
)
. (16)
In these expressions, we use the superscript ∗(123) to
denote the result obtained with the first three equa-
tions from Eqs.(9-12). Under the conditions presented in
Eq.(13), we can easily find out that (h˜da1 h˜
s
a2
−h˜sa1 h˜
d
a2
) ≥ 0,
(h˜db1 h˜
s
b2
− h˜sb1 h˜
d
b2
) ≥ 0, (h˜da1 h˜
s
am
− h˜sa1 h˜
d
am
) ≥ 0 for all
m ≥ 1 and (h˜db2 h˜
s
bn
− h˜sb2 h˜
d
bn
) ≥ 0 for all n ≥ 2. Then
we know that f
(123)
11 (m,n) ≥ 0 hold for all (m,n) ∈ J1.
With this fact, we obtain a lower bound from Eq.(14) by
setting ymn = 0, (m,n) ∈ J1 such that
y11 = y
(123)
11 ≤ y11, (17)
where y
(123)
11 is defined by Eq.(15). This and Eq.(15) are
our major formulas for the decoy-state method imple-
mentation for MDI-QKD in this section.
Similarly, we can get other expressions with choosing
any other three equations from Eqs.(9-12). For example,
we choose Eqs.(9-10,12). By eliminating y12 and y21, we
get another expression of y11 such that
y11 = y
(124)
11 +
∑
(m,n)∈J1
f
(124)
11 (m,n)smn, (18)
where
y
(124)
11 =
h˜sb1 h˜
s
b2
(h˜da1 h˜
s
a2
− h˜sa1 h˜
d
a2
)Y˜dd + (h˜
s
a1
h˜da2 h˜
d
b1
h˜sb2 − h˜
d
a1
h˜sa2 h˜
s
b1
h˜db2)Y˜ds − h˜
d
a1
h˜da2(h˜
d
b1
h˜sb2 − h˜
s
b1
h˜db2)Y˜ss
h˜da1 h˜
s
b1
(h˜da1 h˜
s
a2
− h˜sa1 h˜
d
a2
)(h˜db1 h˜
s
b2
− h˜sb1 h˜
d
b2
)
, (19)
and
f
(124)
11 (m,n) =
h˜da2 h˜
s
bn
(h˜da1 h˜
s
am
− h˜sa1 h˜
d
am
)(h˜db1 h˜
s
b2
− h˜sb1 h˜
d
b2
) + h˜dam h˜
s
b1
(h˜da1 h˜
s
a2
− h˜sa1 h˜
d
a2
)(h˜db2 h˜
s
bn
− h˜sb2 h˜
d
bn
)
h˜da1 h˜
s
b1
(h˜da1 h˜
s
a2
− h˜sa1 h˜
d
a2
)(h˜db1 h˜
s
b2
− h˜sb1 h˜
d
b2
)
. (20)
Under the conditions presented in Eq.(13), we can also
find out that f
(124)
11 (m,n) ≥ 0 for all (m,n) ∈ J1. Then
we know that y
(124)
11 is alos a lower bound of y11. On the
other hand, by comparing f
(123)
11 (m,n) and f
(124)
11 (m,n),
we have
f
(123)
11 (m,n)− f
(124)
11 (m,n)
=
h˜da2(h˜
d
a1
h˜sam − h˜
s
a1
h˜dam)(h˜
d
b1
h˜sbn − h˜
s
b1
h˜dbn)
−h˜da1 h˜
d
b1
h˜sb1(h˜
d
a1
h˜sa2 − h˜
s
a1
h˜da2)
≤ 0,
4for all (m,n) ∈ J1. Then we know that
y
(123)
11 ≥ y
(124)
11 , (21)
with Eq.(14) and Eq.(18). With the relation presented
in Eq.(21) we know that the lower bound y
(123)
11 is tighter
than the lower bound y
(124)
11 . In the same way, we can
get another two lower bounds y
(134)
11 and y
(234)
11 of y11 with
Eqs.(9,11-12) and Eqs.(10-12) respectively. Furthermore,
we can also prove that
y
(123)
11 ≥ y
(134)
11 , y
(123)
11 ≥ y
(234)
11 . (22)
Now we only consider Eq.(9) and Eq.(12). By elimi-
nating y12 or y21 respectively, we get two expressions of
y11 such that
y11 = y
(14a)
11 +
∑
(m,n)∈J2
f
(14a)
11 (m,n)ymn, (23)
y11 = y
(14b)
11 +
∑
(m,n)∈J2
f
(14a)
11 (m,n)ymn, (24)
where J2 = {(m,n)|m ≥ 1, n ≥ 1,m+ n ≥ 3},
y
(14a)
11 =
h˜sa1 h˜
s
b2
Y˜dd − h˜
d
a1
h˜db2 Y˜ss
h˜da1 h˜
s
a1
(h˜db1 h˜
s
b2
− h˜sb1 h˜
d
b2
)
, (25)
y
(14b)
11 =
h˜sa2 h˜
s
b1
Y˜dd − h˜
d
a2
h˜db1 Y˜ss
h˜db1 h˜
s
b1
(h˜da1 h˜
s
a2
− h˜sa1 h˜
d
a2
)
, (26)
and
f
(14a)
11 (m,n) =
h˜da1 h˜
d
b2
h˜sam h˜
s
bn
− h˜sa1 h˜
s
b2
h˜dam h˜
d
bn
h˜da1 h˜
s
a1
(h˜db1 h˜
s
b2
− h˜sb1 h˜
d
b2
)
, (27)
f
(14b)
11 (m,n) =
h˜da2 h˜
d
b1
h˜sam h˜
s
bn
− h˜sa2 h˜
s
b1
h˜dam h˜
d
bn
h˜db1 h˜
s
b1
(h˜da1 h˜
s
a2
− h˜sa1 h˜
d
a2
)
. (28)
For any sources used in the protocol, we must have either
Ka =
h˜sa1 h˜
s
b2
h˜da1 h˜
d
b2
≤
h˜sa2 h˜
s
b1
h˜da2 h˜
d
b1
= Kb or Ka > Kb.
Suppose the former one holds, we can easily find out that
f
(14a)
11 (m,n) ≥ 0 for all (m,n) ∈ J2 and y
(14a)
11 is a lower
bound of y11. On the other hand, if Ka ≥ Kb holds,
we have f
(14b)
11 (m,n) ≥ 0 for all (m,n) ∈ J2 and y
(14b)
11
is a lower bound of y11. Considering the following two
relations
Ka −Kb =
h˜sa1 h˜
d
a2
h˜db1 h˜
s
b2
− h˜da1 h˜
s
a2
h˜sb1 h˜
d
b2
h˜da1 h˜
d
a2
h˜db1 h˜
d
b2
, (29)
and
f
(14a)
11 (m,n)− f
(14b)
11 (m,n)
=
h˜da2 h˜
d
b2
(h˜da1 h˜
s
am
h˜db1 h˜
s
bn
− h˜sa1 h˜
d
am
h˜sb1 h˜
d
bn
)(Ka −Kb)
h˜sa1 h˜
s
b1
(h˜da1 h˜
s
a2
− h˜sa1 h˜a2)(h˜
d
b1
h˜sb2 − h˜
s
b1
h˜db2)
,
we know that Ka−Kb and f
(14a)
11 − f
(14b)
11 have the same
sign which means that they are both positive or negative
simultaneously. Then we can write the lower bound of
y11 with Eq.(9) and Eq.(12) into the following compact
form
y
(14)
11 = min{y
(14a)
11 , y
(14b)
11 }. (30)
If both Alice and Bob use coherent pulses, the lower
bound given by Eq.(30) is just the result presented in
Refs. [24, 26]. In the coming, we will prove that the lower
bound y
(123)
11 given in Eq.(15) is more tightly than y
(14)
11 .
Firstly, if we suppose Ka ≤ Kb holds, then we know that
h˜sa1 h˜
d
a2
h˜db1 h˜
s
b2
≤ h˜da1 h˜
s
a2
h˜sb1 h˜
d
b2
and y
(14)
11 = y
(14a)
11 . For any
(m,n) ∈ J1 we have
f
(123)
11 (m,n)− f
(14a)
11 (m,n)
= −
(h˜da1 h˜
s
am
− h˜sa1 h˜am)Da
h˜da1 h˜
s
a1
h˜db1(h˜
d
a1
h˜sa2 − h˜
s
a1
h˜a2)(h˜
d
b1
h˜sb2 − h˜
s
b1
h˜db2)
,
where Da = (h˜
d
a1
h˜sa2 h˜
d
b1
h˜db2 h˜
s
bn
+ h˜sa1 h˜
d
a2
h˜sb1 h˜
d
b2
h˜dbn +
h˜sa1 h˜
d
a2
h˜db1 h˜
s
b2
h˜dbn + h˜
s
a1
h˜da2 h˜
d
b1
h˜db2 h˜
s
bn
) ≥ h˜db2(h˜
d
a1
h˜sa2 −
h˜sa1 h˜
d
a2
)(h˜db1 h˜
s
bn
− h˜sb1 h˜
d
bn
). Then we know that
f
(123)
11 (m,n)− f
(14a)
11 (m,n)
≤ −
h˜db2(h˜
d
a1
h˜sam − h˜
s
a1
h˜dam)(h˜
d
b1
h˜sbn − h˜
s
b1
h˜dbn)
h˜da1 h˜
s
a1
h˜db1(h˜
d
b1
h˜sb2 − h˜
s
b1
h˜db2)
≤ 0.
We can easily know that y
(123)
11 ≥ y
(14)
11 when Ka ≤ Kb
with this equation. Secondly, if we suppose Ka >
Kb holds, we can easily prove that f
(123)
11 (m,n) −
f
(14b)
11 (m,n) ≤ 0 for all (m,n) ∈ J1 within the same way.
Then we get y
(123)
11 ≥ y
(14)
11 when Ka > Kb. This com-
pletes the proof that y
(123)
11 ≥ y
(14)
11 .
In order to estimate the final key rate, we also need
the upper bound of error rate caused by the two single-
photon pulses, say e11. Similar to the total gain, the total
error rate with source αβ chosen by Alice and Bob can
be written as [18]
T˜dd = h˜
d
a1
h˜db1t11 + h˜
d
a1
h˜db2t12 + h˜
d
a2
h˜db1t21 +Kdd,(31)
T˜ds = h˜
d
a1
h˜sb1t11 + h˜
d
a1
h˜sb2t12 + h˜
d
a2
h˜sb1t21 +Kds,(32)
T˜sd = h˜
s
a1
h˜db1t11 + h˜
s
a1
h˜db2t12 + h˜
s
a2
h˜db1t21 +Ksd,(33)
T˜ss = h˜
s
a1
h˜sb1t11 + h˜
s
a1
h˜sb2t12 + h˜
s
a2
h˜sb1t21 +Kss,(34)
where Tij = YijEij , (i, j ∈ {v, d, s}), tmn = ymnemn, and
T˜dd =
Tdd
ad0b
d
0
−
Tdv
ad0b
v
0
−
Tvd
av0b
d
0
+
Tvv
av0b
v
0
, (35)
T˜ds =
Tds
ad0b
s
0
−
Tdv
ad0b
v
0
−
Tvs
av0b
s
0
+
Tvv
av0b
v
0
, (36)
T˜sd =
Tsd
as0b
d
0
−
Tsv
as0b
v
0
−
Tvd
av0b
d
0
+
Tvv
av0b
v
0
, (37)
T˜ss =
Tss
as0b
s
0
−
Tsv
as0b
v
0
−
Tvs
av0b
s
0
+
Tvv
av0b
v
0
, (38)
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FIG. 1: (Color online) The relative value between estimated
parameter of y11 and the asymptotic limit of the infinite
decoy-state method versus the total channel transmission loss
using 3-intensity decoy state MDI-QKD. In the simulations,
we assume that µv = νv = 0.01, µd = νd = 0.1, µs = νs = 0.5
and the value of other parameters are presented in Table I.
and Kij =
∑
(k,l)∈J1
h˜iak h˜
j
bl
tkl, (i, j ∈ {d, s}) with J1 =
{(k, l)|k, l ≥ 1, k + l ≥ 4}. According to Eq.(31), we can
find out the upper bound of e11 such that
e11 ≤ e
(1)
11 =
T˜dd
h˜da1 h˜
d
b1
y11
= e11. (39)
In the protocol, there are two different bases. We de-
note yZ11 and y
X
11 for yields of single-photon pulse pairs
in the Z and X bases, respectively. Consider those post-
selected bits cased by source dAdB in the Z basis. After
an error test, we know the bit-flip error rate of this set,
say TZdAdB = Y
Z
dAdB
EZdAdB . We also need the phase-flip
rate for the subset of bits which are caused by the two
single-photon pulse, say eph11 , which is equal to the flip
rate of post-selected bits caused by a single photon in
the X basis, say eX11. Given this, we can now calculate
the key rate by the well-know formula. For example, for
those post-selected bits caused by source sAsB, it is
R = as1b
s
1y
Z
11[1−H(e
X
11)]− Y
Z
sAsB
fH(EZsAsB ), (40)
where f is the efficiency factor of the error correction
method used.
III. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
Now, we present some numerical simulations to com-
paring our results with the existing results [24, 26]. Be-
low for simplicity, we suppose that Alice and Bob use the
coherent-state sources. Here, we denote Alice’s sources
{vA, dA, sA} by their intensities {µv, µd, µs} and Bob’s
sources {vB, dB, sB} by their intensities {νv, νd, νs} re-
spectively. The UTP locates in the middle of Alice and
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FIG. 2: (Color online) The estimated parameter of e11 versus
the total channel transmission loss using 3-intensity decoy
state MDI-QKD. In the simulations, we assume that µv =
νv = 0.01, µd = νd = 0.1, µs = νs = 0.5 and the value of
other parameters are presented in Table I.
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FIG. 3: (Color online) The estimated key rate R versus chan-
nel transmission using 3-intensity decoy state MDI-QKD. In
the simulations, we assume that µv = νv = 0.01, µd = νd =
0.1, µs = νs = 0.5 and the value of other parameters are
presented in Table I.
Bob, and the UTP’s detectors are identical, i.e., they
have the same dark count rate and detection efficiency,
and their detection efficiency does not depend on the in-
coming signals. We shall estimate what values would be
probably observed for the gains and error rates in the
normal cases by the linear models as in [18, 27, 28]:
|n〉〈n| =
n∑
k=0
Cknξ
k(1− ξ)n−k|k〉〈k|
where ξk is the transmittance for a distance from Al-
ice to the UTB. For fair comparison, we use the same
parameter values used in [18, 27, 28] for our numerical
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FIG. 4: (Color online) The relative value between the opti-
mal key rate obtained with different methods and the asymp-
totic limit of the infinite decoy-state method versus the total
channel transmission loss using 3-intensity decoy state MDI-
QKD. In the simulations, we assume that µv = νv = 0.01,
µd = νd = 0.1, µs = νs and the value of other parameters are
presented in Table I. The optimal key rate is just the value
with maximizing the key rate with µs = νs ∈ (µd, 1).
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FIG. 5: (Color online) The optimal intensities versus the total
channel transmission loss using 3-intensity decoy state MDI-
QKD. In the simulations, we assume that µv = νv = 0.01,
µd = νd = 0.1, µs = νs and the value of other parameters are
presented in Table I. The optimal densities of the signal-state
pulses are obtained by maximizing the key rate.
TABLE I: List of experimental parameters used in numeri-
cal simulations: e0 is the error rate of background, ed is the
misalignment-error probability; pd is the dark count rate per
detector; f is the error correction inefficiency.
e0 ed pd f
0.5 1.5% 3.0× 10−6 1.16
evaluation, which follow the experiment reported in [29].
For simplicity, we shall put the detection efficiency to the
overall transmittance η = ξ2ζ. We assume all detectors
have the same detection efficiency ζ and dark count rate
pd. The values of these parameters are presented in Ta-
ble I. With this, the total gains Y ωµi,νj , (ω = X,Z) and
error rates Y ωµi,νjE
ω
µi,νj
, (ω = X,Z) of Alice’s intensity
µi(i ∈ {v, d, s}) and Bob’s intensity νj(j ∈ {v, d, s}) can
be calculated. By using these values, we can estimate the
lower bounds of yield yZ11 with Eq.(17) and Eq.(30). Also,
we can estimate the upper bounds of error rate eX11 with
Eq.(39) where the lower bound of yX11 being estimated by
Eq.(17) and Eq.(30). The estimated parameters of y11
and e11 are shown in Fig.1 and Fig.2, respectively, which
clearly shows that our methods are more tightly than the
pre-existed results. In order to see more clearly, in Fig.1,
we plot the relative value of y11 to the result obtained
with the infinite decoy-state method. We can observe
that our results are more close to the asymptotic limit
of the infinite decoy-state method than the pre-existed
results [24, 26]. Furthermore, with these parameters, we
can estimate the final key rate R of this protocol with
Eq.(40) which is shown in Fig.3. In these figures, the
blue dashed line is obtained by Eq.(30) which is just the
results presented in Refs. [24, 26], the red solid line is ob-
tained by the method presented in section 2 with Eq.(17),
the black dash-dot line is the result obtained by the infi-
nite decoy-state method. In the simulation, the densities
used by Alice and Bob are assigned to µv = νv = 0.01,
µd = νd = 0.1, µs = νs = 0.5.
Furthermore, if we fix the densities of the decoy-state
pulses used by Alice and Bob, the final key rate will
change with Alice and Bob taking different densities for
their signal-state pulses. Then we can find out the opti-
mal densities of their signal-state pulses with maximizing
the final key rate. Here, we also take µv = νv = 0.01,
µd = νd = 0.1 and assume that µs = νs ∈ (µd, 1).
In Fig.4, we plot the relative value of the optimal key
rate to the result obtained with the infinite decoy-state
method. We can observe that our result is better than
the pre-existed results. The optimal densities with the
optimal key rate versus the total channel transmission
loss is given in Fig.5.
IV. CONCLUSION
We study the MDI-QKD in practice where the inten-
sities of all 3 different states can be nonzero. Our result
here is the most general result for the 3-intensity method:
Setting the weakest state to be zero, we obtain the re-
sult in the special case where a vacuum state and two
non-vacuum states are used[27]. The result here is not
limited to the coherent states. It applies to any states
that satisfy Eq.(13), e.g., the heralded states from the
parametric down conversion. Our result is most efficient:
It offers a more tightened bound for y11 and therefore a
higher key rate than the prior art[24], as has been strictly
7proven and also numerically demonstrated. The key rate
can be further improved when it is combined with the
method as shown in Ref.[28].
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